This paper reflects on how Moore's Law has driven the design of FPGAs through three epochs: the age of invention, the age of expansion, and the age of accumulation. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Xilinx introduced the first field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) in 1984, though they were not called FPGAs until Actel popularized the term around 1988. Over the ensuing 30 years, the device we call an FPGA increased in capacity by more than a factor of 10 000 and increased in speed by a factor of 100. Cost and energy consumption per unit function decreased by more than a factor of 1000 (see Fig. 1 ).
These advancements have been driven largely by process technology, and it is tempting to perceive the evolution of FPGAs as a simple progression of capacity, following semiconductor scaling. This perception is too simple. The real story of FPGA progress is much more interesting.
Since their introduction, FPGA devices have progressed through several distinct phases of development. Each phase was driven by both process technology opportunity and application demand. These driving pressures caused observable changes in the device characteristics and tools. In this paper, I review three phases I call the ''Ages'' of FPGAs. Each age is eight years long and each became apparent only in retrospect. The three ages are:
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II. PREAMBLE: WHAT WAS THE BIG DEAL ABOUT FPGAs?
A. FPGA Versus ASIC In the 1980s, Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) companies brought an amazing product to the electronics market: the built-to-order custom integrated circuit. By the mid-1980s, dozens of companies were selling ASICs, and in the fierce competition, the winning attributes were low cost, high capacity and high speed. When FPGAs appeared, they compared poorly on all of these measures, yet they thrived. Why?
The ASIC functionality was determined by custom mask tooling. ASIC customers paid for those masks with an upfront non-recurring engineering (NRE) charge. Because they had no custom tooling, FPGAs reduced the up-front cost and risk of building custom digital logic. By making one custom silicon device that could be used by hundreds or thousands of customers, the FPGA vendor effectively amortized the NRE costs over all customers, resulting in no NRE charge for any one customer, while increasing the per-unit chip cost for all.
The up-front NRE cost ensured that FPGAs were more cost effective than ASICs at some volume [38] . FPGA vendors touted this in their ''crossover point,'' the number of units that justified the higher NRE expense of an ASIC. In Fig. 2 , the graphed lines show the total cost for a number units purchased. An ASIC has an initial cost for the NRE, and each subsequent unit adds its unit cost to the total. An FPGA has no NRE charge, but each unit costs more than the functionally equivalent ASIC, hence the steeper line. The two lines meet at the crossover point. If fewer than that number of units is required, the FPGA solution is cheaper; more than that number of units indicates the ASIC has lower overall cost.
The disadvantage of the FPGA per-unit cost premium over ASIC diminished over time as NRE costs became a larger fraction of the total cost of ownership of ASIC. The dashed lines in Fig. 2 indicate the total cost at some process node. The solid lines depict the situation at the next process node, with increased NRE cost, but lower cost per chip. Both FPGA and ASIC took advantage of lower cost manufacturing, while ASIC NRE charges continued to climb, pushing the crossover point higher. Eventually, the crossover point grew so high that for the majority of customers, the number of units no longer justified an ASIC. Custom silicon was warranted only for very high performance or very high volume; all others could use a programmable solution.
This insight, that Moore's Law [33] would eventually propel FPGA capability to cover ASIC requirements, was a fundamental early insight in the programmable logic business. Today, device cost is less of a driver in the FPGA versus ASIC decision than performance, time-to-market, power consumption, I/O capacity and other capabilities. Many ASIC customers use older process technology, lowering their NRE cost, but reducing the per-chip cost advantage.
Not only did FPGAs eliminate the up-front masking charges and reduce inventory costs, but they also reduced design costs by eliminating whole classes of design problems. These design problems included transistor-level design, testing, signal integrity, crosstalk, I/O design and clock distribution.
As important as low up-front cost and simpler design were, the major FPGA advantages were instantly availability and reduced visibility of a failure. Despite extensive simulation, ASICs rarely seemed to be correct the first time. With wafer-fabrication turnaround times in the weeks or months, silicon re-spins impacted schedules significantly, and as masking costs rose, silicon re-spins were noticeable to ever-rising levels in the company. The high cost of error demanded extensive chip verification. Since an FPGA can be reworked in minutes, FPGA designs incurred no weeks-long delay for an error. As a result, verification need not be as thorough. ''Self-emulation,'' known colloquially as ''download-it-and-try-it,'' could replace extensive simulation.
Finally, there was the ASIC production risk: an ASIC company made money only when their customer's design went into production. In the 1980s, because of changing requirements during the development process, product failures or outright design errors, only about one-third of all designs actually went to production. Two-thirds of designs lost money. The losses were incurred not only by the ASIC customers, but also by the ASIC suppliers, whose NRE charges rarely covered their actual costs and never covered the cost of lost opportunity in their rapidly depreciating manufacturing facilities. On the other hand, programmable-logic companies and customers could still make money on small volume, and a small error could be corrected quickly, without costly mask-making. 
B. FPGA Versus PAL
Programmable logic was well established before the FPGA. EPROM-programmed Programmable Array Logic (PAL) had carved out a market niche in the early 1980s. However, FPGAs had an architectural advantage. To understand the FPGA advantage, we first look at the simple programmable logic structures of these early 1980s devices. A PAL device, as depicted in Fig. 3 , consists of a twolevel logic structure [6] , [38] . Inputs are shown entering at the bottom. On the left side, a programmable and array generates product terms, ands of any combination of the inputs and their inverses. A fixed or gate in the block at the right completes the combinational logic function of the macrocell's product terms. Every macrocell output is an output of the chip. An optional register in the macrocell and feedback to the input of the and array enable a very flexible state machine implementation.
Not every function could be implemented in one pass through the PAL's macrocell array, but nearly all common functions could be, and those that could not were realized in two passes through the array. The delay through the PAL array is the same regardless of the function performed or where it is located in the array. PALs had simple fitting software that mapped logic quickly to arbitrary locations in the array with no performance concerns. PAL fitting software was available from independent EDA vendors, allowing IC manufacturers to easily add PALs to their product line.
PALs were very efficient from a manufacturing point of view. The PAL structure is very similar to an EPROM memory array, in which transistors are packed densely to yield an efficient implementation. PALs were sufficiently similar to memories that many memory manufacturers were able to expand their product line with PALs. When the cyclical memory business faltered, memory manufacturers entered the programmable logic business.
The architectural issue with PALs is evident when one considers scaling. The number of programmable points in the and array grows with the square of the number of inputs (more precisely, inputs times product terms). Process scaling delivers more transistors with the square of the shrink factor. However, the quadratic increase in the and array limits PALs to grow logic only linearly with the shrink factor. PAL input and product-term lines are also heavily loaded, so delay grows rapidly as size increases. A PAL, like any memory of this type, has word lines and bit lines that span the entire die. With every generation, the ratio of the drive of the programmed transistor to the loading decreased. More inputs or product terms increased loading on those lines. Increasing transistor size to lower resistance also raised total capacitance. To maintain speed, power consumption rose dramatically. Large PALs were impractical in both area and performance. In response, in the 1980s, Altera pioneered the Complex Programmable Logic Device (CPLD), composed of several PAL-type blocks with smaller crossbar connections among them. But FPGAs had a more scalable solution.
The FPGA innovation was the elimination of the and array that provided the programmability. Instead, configuration memory cells were distributed around the array to control functionality and wiring. This change gave up the memory-array-like efficiency of the PAL structure in favor of architectural scalability. The architecture of the FPGA, shown in Fig. 4 , consists of an array of programmable logic blocks and interconnect with field-programmable switches. The capacity and performance of the FPGA were no longer limited by the quadratic growth and wiring layout of the and array. Not every function was an output of the chip, so 
III. AGE OF INVENTION 1984-1991
The first FPGA, the Xilinx XC2064, contained only 64 logic blocks, each of which held two three-input Look-Up Tables (LUTs) and one register [8] . By today's counting, this would be about 64 logic cells, less than 1000 gates. Despite its small capacity, it was a very large dieVlarger than the commercial microprocessors of the day. The 2.5-micron process technology used for the XC2064 was barely able to yield it. In those early years, cost containment was critical to the success of FPGAs.
''Cost containment was critical to the success of FPGAs.'' A modern reader will accept that statement as some kind of simplistic statement of the obvious, but this interpretation seriously underemphasizes the issue. Die size and cost per function were crushingly vital. The XC2064, with only 64 user-accessible flip-flops, cost hundreds of dollars because it was such a large die. Since yield (and hence, cost) is superlinear for large die, a 5% increase in die size could have doubled the cost or, worse, yield could have dropped to zero leaving the startup company with no product whatsoever. Cost containment was not a question of mere optimization; it was a question of whether or not the product would exist. It was a question of corporate life or death. In those early years, cost containment was critical to the success of FPGAs.
As a result of cost pressure, FPGA architects used their newfound freedom to maximize the efficiency of the FPGA, turning to any advantage in process technology and architecture. Although static memory-based FPGAs were re-programmable, they required an external PROM to store the programming when power was off. Reprogrammability was not considered to be an asset, and Xilinx downplayed it to avoid customer concerns about what happened to their logic when power was removed. And memory dominated the die area.
Antifuse devices promised the elimination of the second die and elimination of the area penalty of memory-cell storage, but at the expense of one-time programmability. The early antifuse was a single transistor structure; the memory cell switch was six transistors. The area savings of antifuses over memory cells was inescapable. Actel invented the antifuse and brought it to market [17] , and in 1990 the largest capacity FPGA was the Actel 1280. Quicklogic and Crosspoint followed Actel and also developed devices based on the advantages of the antifuse process technology.
In the 1980s, Xilinx's four-input LUT-based architectures were considered ''coarse-grained''. Four-input functions were observed as a ''sweet spot'' in logic designs, but analysis of netlists showed that many LUT configurations were unused. Further, many LUTs had unused inputs, wasting precious area. Seeking to improve efficiency, FPGA architects looked to eliminate waste in the logic block. Several companies implemented finer-grained architectures containing fixed functions to eliminate the logic cell waste. The Algotronix CAL used a fixed-MUX function implementation for a two-input LUT [24] . Concurrent (later Atmel) and their licensee, IBM, used a small-cell variant that included two-input nand and xor gates and a register in the CL devices. Pilkington based their architecture on a single nand gate as the logic block [23] , [34] . They licensed Plessey (ERA family), Toshiba (TC family) and Motorola (MPA family) to use their nandcell-based, SRAM-programmed device. The extreme of fine-grained architecture was the Crosspoint CLi FPGA, in which individual transistors were connected to one another with antifuse-programmable connections [31] .
Early FPGA architects noted that an efficient interconnect architecture should observe the two-dimensionality of the integrated circuit. The long, slow wires of PALs were replaced by short connections between adjacent blocks that could be strung together as needed by programming to form longer routing paths. Initially, simple pass transistors steered signals through the interconnect segments to adjacent blocks. Wiring was efficient because there were no unused fractions of wires. These optimizations greatly shrank the interconnect area and made FPGAs possible. At the same time, though, they increased signal delay and delay uncertainty through FPGA wiring due to large capacitances and distributed series resistances through the pass transistor switch network. Since interconnect wires and switches added size, but not (billable) logic, FPGA architects were reluctant to add much. Early FPGAs were notoriously difficult to use because they were starved for interconnect.
IV. AGE OF INVENTION IN RETROSPECT
In the Age of Invention, FPGAs were small, so the design problem was small. Though they were desirable, synthesis
Trimberger: Three Ages of FPGAs and even automated placement and routing were not considered essential. Many deemed it impractical even to attempt design automation on the personal computers of the time, since ASIC placement and routing was being done on mainframe computers. Manual design, both logical and physical, was acceptable because of the small problem size. Manual design was often necessary because of the limited routing resources on the chips [41] .
Radically different architectures precluded universal FPGA design tools, as were available in the ASIC business. FPGA vendors took on the added burden of EDA development for their devices. This was eventually recognized as an advantage, as FPGA vendors experimented and improved their architectures. The PAL vendors of the previous decade had relied upon external tool vendors to provide software for mapping designs into their PALs. As a result, PAL vendors were restricted to those architectures the tool vendors supported, leading to commoditization, low margins and lack of innovation. PLD architecture was stifled while FPGA architecture flourished.
A further advantage of captive software development was that FPGA customers were not required to purchase tools from a third-party EDA company, which would have increased their NRE costs. As they did with NRE charges, FPGA vendors amortized their tool development costs into their silicon pricing, keeping the up-front cost of using their devices very low. EDA companies were not much interested in FPGA tools anyway with their fragmented market, low volume, low selling price, and requirement to run on underpowered computers.
In the Age of Invention, FPGAs were much smaller than the applications that users wanted to put into them. As a result, multiple-FPGA systems [1] , [42] became popular, and automated multi-chip partitioning software was identified as an important component of an FPGA design suite [36] , even as automatic placement and routing were not.
V. INTERLUDE: SHAKEOUT IN FPGA BUSINESS
The Age of Invention ended with brutal attrition in the FPGA business. A modern reader may not recognize most of the companies or product names in Section III and in the FPGA genealogical tree in Fig. 5 [6] , [38] . Many of the companies simply vanished. Others quietly sold their assets as they exited the FPGA business. The cause of this attrition was more than the normal market dynamics. There were important changes in the technology, and those companies that did not take advantage of the changes could not compete. Quantitative changes due to Moore's Law resulted in qualitative changes in the FPGAs built with semiconductor technology. These changes characterized the Age of Expansion.
VI. AGE OF EXPANSION 1992-1999
Through the 1990s, Moore's Law continued its rapid pace of improvement, doubling transistor count every two years.
Pioneering the fabless business model, FPGA startup companies typically could not obtain leading-edge silicon technology in the early 1990s. As a result, FPGAs began the Age of Expansion lagging the process introduction curve. In the 1990s, they became process leaders as the foundries realized the value of using the FPGA as a process-driver application. Foundries were able to build SRAM FPGAs as soon as they were able to yield transistors and wires in a new technology. FPGA vendors sold their huge devices while foundries refined their processes. Each new generation of silicon doubled the number of transistors available, which doubled the size of the largest possible FPGA and halved the cost per function. More import than simple transistor scaling, the introduction of chemical-mechanical polishing (CMP) permitted foundries to stack more metal layers. Valuable Trimberger: Three Ages of FPGAs for ASICs, this capability was explosive for FPGAs because the cost of valuable (nonbillable) interconnect dropped even faster than the cost of transistors, and FPGA vendors aggressively increased the interconnect on their devices to accommodate the larger capacity (see Fig. 6 ).
This rapid process improvement had several effects which we now examine.
A. Area Became Less Precious
No one who joined the FPGA industry in the mid-1990s would agree that cost was unimportant or area was not precious. However, those who had experienced the agonies of product development in the 1980s certainly saw the difference. In the 1980s, transistor efficiency was necessary in order to deliver any product whatsoever. In the 1990s, it was merely a matter of product definition. Area was still important, but now it could be traded off for performance, features and ease-of-use. The resulting devices were less silicon efficient. This was unthinkable in the Age of Invention just a few years earlier.
B. Design Automation Became Essential
In the Age of Expansion, FPGA device capacity increased rapidly as costs fell. FPGA applications became too large for manual design. In 1992, the flagship Xilinx XC4010 delivered a (claimed) maximum of 10 000 gates. By 1999, the Virtex XCV1000 was rated at a million. In the early 1990s, at the start of the Age of Expansion, automatic placement and routing was preferred, but not entirely trusted. By the end of the 1990s, automated synthesis [9] , placement and routing [3] , [4] , [19] , [32] , [37] were required steps in the design process. Without the automation, the design effort would be simply too great. The life of an FPGA company was now dependent upon the ability of design automation tools to target the device. Those FPGA companies that controlled their software controlled their future.
Cheaper metal from process scaling led to more programmable interconnect wire, so that automated placement tools could succeed with a less-precise placement. Automated design tools required automation-friendly architectures, architectures with regular and plentiful interconnect resources to simplify algorithmic decisionmaking. Cheaper wire also admitted longer wire segmentation, interconnect wires that spanned multiple logic blocks [2] , [28] , [44] . Wires spanning many blocks effectively make physically distant logic logically closer, improving performance. The graph in Fig. 7 shows large performance gains from a combination of process technology and interconnect reach. Process scaling alone would have brought down the curve, but retained the shape; longer segmentation flattened the curve. The longer segmented interconnect simplified placement because with longer interconnect, it was not as essential to place two blocks in exactly the right alignment needed to connect them with a high performance path. The placer can do a sloppier job and still achieve good results.
On the down side, when the entire length of the wire segment is not used, parts of the metal trace are effectively wasted. Many silicon-efficient Age of Invention architectures were predicated on wiring efficiency, featuring short wires that eliminated waste. Often, they rigidly followed the two-dimensional limitation of the physical silicon giving those FPGAs the label ''cellular.'' In the Age of Expansion, longer wire segmentation was possible because the cost of wasted metal was now acceptable. Architectures dominated by nearest-neighbor-only connections could not match the performance or ease-of-automation of architectures that took advantage of longer wire segmentation.
A similar efficiency shift applied to logic blocks. In the Age of Invention, small, simple logic blocks were attractive because their logic delay was short and because they wasted little when unused or partially used. Half of the configuration memory cells in a four-input LUT are wasted when a three-input function is instantiated in it. Clever designers could manually map complex logic structures efficiently into a minimum number of fine-grained logic blocks, but automated tools were not as successful. For larger functions, the need to connect several small blocks put greater demand on the interconnect. In the Age of Expansion, not only were there more logic blocks, but the blocks themselves became more complex.
Many Age of Invention architectures, built for efficiency with irregular logic blocks and sparse interconnect, were difficult to place and route automatically. During the Age of Invention, this was not a serious issue because the devices were small enough that manual design was practical. But excessive area efficiency was fatal to many devices and companies in the Age of Expansion. Fine-grained architectures based on minimizing logic waste (such as the Pilkington nand-gate block, the Algotronix/Xilinx 6200 Mux-based 2LUT block, the Crosspoint transistor-block) simply died. Architectures that achieved their efficiency by starving the interconnect also died. These included all nearest-neighbor grid-based architectures. The Age of Expansion also doomed time-multiplexed devices [14] , [39] , Trimberger: Three Ages of FPGAs since equivalent capacity expansion could be had without the attendant complexity and performance loss by merely waiting for the next process generation. The survivors in the FPGA business were those that leveraged process technology advancement to enable automation. Altera was first, bringing the long-distance connections of their CPLDs to the Altera FLEX architecture. FLEX was more automatable than other FPGAs of the period that were dominated by short wires. It achieved quick success. In the mid-1990s, AT&T/ Lucent released ORCA [26] and Xilinx scaled up its XC4000 interconnect in number and length as it built larger devices. The Age of Expansion was firmly established.
C. Emergence of SRAM as Technology of Choice
One aspect of the rapid progress of Moore's Law was the need to be on the forefront of process technology. The easiest way to double the capacity and halve the cost for logic was to target the next process technology node. This pressured FPGA vendors to adopt leading-edge process technology. FPGA companies using technologies that could not be easily implemented on a new process were at a structural disadvantage. This was the case with nonvolatile programmable technologies such as EPROM, Flash and antifuse. When a new process technology becomes available, the first components that are available are transistors and wires, the essential components of electronics. A static-memory-based device could use a new, denser process immediately. Antifuse devices were accurately promoted as being more efficient on a particular technology node, but it took months or years to qualify the antifuse on the new node. By the time the antifuse was proven, SRAM FPGAs were already starting to deliver on the next node. Antifuse technologies could not keep pace with technology, so they needed to be twice as efficient as SRAM just to maintain product parity.
Antifuse devices suffered a second disadvantage: lack of reprogrammability. As customers grew accustomed to ''volatile'' SRAM FPGAs, they began to appreciate the advantages of in-system programmability and field-updating of hardware. In contrast, a one-time-programmable device needed to be physically handled to be updated or to remedy design errors. The alternative for antifuse devices was an extensive ASIC-like verification phase, which undermined the value of the FPGA.
The rapid pace of Moore's Law in the Age of Expansion relegated antifuse and flash FPGAs to niche products.
D. Emergence of LUT as Logic Cell of Choice
LUTs survived and dominated despite their documented inefficiency in the Age of Expansion for several reasons. First, LUT-based architectures were easy targets for synthesis tools. This statement would have been disputed in the mid-1990s, when synthesis vendors complained that FPGAs were not ''synthesis friendly.'' This perception arose because synthesis tools were initially developed to target ASICs. Their technology mappers expected a small library in which each cell was described as a network of nands with inverters. Since a LUT implements any of the 2 2 n combinations of its inputs, a complete library would have been enormous. ASIC technology mappers did a poor job on LUT-based FPGAs. But by the mid-1990s, targeted LUT mappers exploited the simplicity of mapping arbitrary functions into LUTs [9] .
The LUT has hidden efficiencies. A LUT is a memory, and memories lay out efficiently in silicon. The LUT also saves interconnect. FPGA programmable interconnect is expensive in area and delay. Rather than a simple metal wire as in an ASIC, FPGA interconnect contains buffers, routing multiplexers and the memory cells to control them. Therefore, much more of the cost of the logic is actually in the interconnect [15] . Since a LUT implements any function of its inputs, automation tools need only route the desired signals together at a LUT in order to retire the function of those inputs. There was no need to make multiple levels of LUTs just to create the desired function of a small set of inputs. LUT input pins are arbitrarily swappable, so the router need not target a specific pin. As a result, LUT-based logic reduced the amount of interconnect required to implement a function. With good synthesis, the waste from unused LUT functionality was less than the savings from the reduced interconnect requirement.
Distributed-memory-cell programming permitted architectural freedom and gave FPGA vendors nearly universal access to process technology. LUTs for logic implementation eased the burden on interconnect. Xilinx-derived LUT-based architectures appeared at Xilinx second sources: Monolithic Memories, AMD and AT&T. In the Age of Expansion, other companies, notably Altera, and AT&T/Lucent, adopted memory cell and LUT architectures as well.
VII. INTERLUDE: FPGA CAPACITY BELL CURVE
The bell curve in Fig. 8 represents the histogram of distribution of sizes of ASIC applications. FPGA capacity at some time is a point on the X-axis, shown by a vertical bar. All the applications to the left of the bar are those that can be addressed by FPGAs, so the addressable market for FPGAs is the shaded area under the curve to the left of the Fig. 8 . Growth of the FPGA addressable market.
Trimberger: Three Ages of FPGAs bar. During the Age of Expansion, FPGA capacity increased at Moore's Law pace, so the bar moved to the right. Of course, the entire bell curve of applications also moved to the right, but the rate of growth in application size was slower than the FPGA capacity growth. As a result, the bar representing FPGAs moved quickly to the right relative to the distribution of designs. Since FPGAs were addressing the low end of the curve, even a small increase in available capacity admitted a large number of new applications. During the Age of Expansion, FPGA capacity covered a growing fraction of extant designs and grew to address the majority of ASIC applications.
This increasing applicability can also be seen from the ''Design Gap'' slide popular with EDA vendors in the late 1990s (Fig. 9) . The capacity of ASICs and FPGAs grew with Moore's Law: ASICs growing at a 59% annual growth rate, and FPGAs at 48% annual growth rate. The observed average ASIC design start grew considerably more slowly, only 25% per year. As a result, FPGA capacity met the average ASIC design size in 2000, though for a large (expensive) FPGA. By 2004, though, a ten-dollar FPGA was predicted to meet the average ASIC requirement. That crossover point moved farther out in the early 2000s as FPGAs addressed the low end of the ASIC market and those small designs became FPGA designs. Small designs were no longer included in the average ASIC design size calculation, thereby inflating the average ASIC design size in the new millennium. Today, the average ASIC is much larger than Fig. 9 would suggest, because FPGAs successfully absorbed nearly the entire low-end of the ASIC business.
VIII. AGE OF EXPANSION IN RETROSPECT
Through the Age of Expansion, Moore's Law rapidly increased the capacity of FPGAs, leading to a demand for design automation and permitting longer interconnect segmentation. Overly efficient architectures that could not be effectively automated simply disappeared. SRAM devices were first to exploit new process technology and dominated the business. FPGAs encroached on ASIC territory as FPGA device capacity grew more rapidly than the demand from applications. No longer did users clamor for multi-FPGA partitioning software: designs fit, sometimes snugly, into the available FPGAs.
As FPGAs became more popular, EDA companies became interested in providing tools for them. However, overtures by EDA companies were viewed with suspicion. FPGA veterans had seen how PLD vendors had lost control over their innovation by surrendering the software. They refused to let that happen in the FPGA domain. Further, the major FPGA companies feared their customers could become dependent upon an external EDA company's tools. If that happened, the EDA company could effectively drive up the FPGA NRE by their software tools prices. This would undermine the FPGA value proposition, shifting the crossover point back to lower volume. Some important FPGA-EDA alliances were made in the synthesis domainV an arms-length from the physical design tools that defined the architecture. Despite the alliances, the FPGA companies maintained competitive projects to prevent the possibility of dependence. In the Age of Expansion, FPGA vendors found themselves competing against both ASIC technology and EDA technology.
IX. INTERLUDE: XILINX MARKETING, CA. 2000
By the late 1990s, the Age of Expansion was well understood in the FPGA business. FPGA vendors were aggressively pursuing process technology as the solution to their size, performance and capacity issues. Each new process generation brought with it numerous new applications. The slide in Fig. 10 is excerpted from a Xilinx marketing 
X. AGE OF ACCUMULATION 2000-2007
By the start of the new millennium, FPGAs were common components of digital systems. Capacity and design size were growing and FPGAs had found a huge market in the data communications industry. The dot-com bust of the early 2000s created a need for lower cost. The increasing cost and complexity of silicon manufacturing eliminated ''casual'' ASIC users. Custom silicon was simply too risky for a small team to execute successfully. When they saw they could fit their problem into an FPGA, they became FPGA customers.
As in the Age of Expansion, the inexorable pace of Moore's Law made FPGAs ever larger. Now they were larger than the typical problem size. There is nothing bad about having capacity greater than what is needed, but neither is there anything particularly virtuous in it. As a result, customers were unwilling to pay a large premium for the largest FPGA.
Increased capacity alone was insufficient to guarantee market growth, either. Consider Fig. 11 , the FPGA bell curve, again. As the FPGA capacity passed the average design size, the peak of the bell curve, an increase in capacity admitted progressively fewer applications. Mere size, which virtually guaranteed a successful product in the Age of Expansion, attracted fewer and fewer new customers in the years following.
FPGA vendors addressed this challenge in two ways. For the low-end of the market, they refocused on efficiency and produced families of lower-capacity, lower-performance ''low-cost'' FPGAs: Spartan from Xilinx, Cyclone from Altera and EC/ECP from Lattice.
For the high-end, FPGA vendors looked to make it easier for customers to fill up their spacious FPGAs. They produced libraries of soft logic (IP) for important functions. The most notable of these soft logic functions were microprocessors (Xilinx MicroBlaze and Altera Nios) [21] , memory controllers and various communications protocol stacks. Before Ethernet MAC was implemented in transistors on Virtex-4, it was implemented in LUTs as a soft core for Virtex-II. Standard interfaces to IP components consumed additional LUTs, but that inefficiency was not a great concern compared with the design effort savings.
Large FPGAs were larger than the average ASIC design. By the mid-2000s, only ASIC emulators needed multi-chip partitioners. More customers were interested in aggregating multiple, potentially unrelated components on a single spacious FPGA [25] . Xilinx promoted ''Internet Reconfigurable Logic'' and partitioning of the FPGA area to allow dynamic insertion of functional units into a subset of the programmable logic resources.
The characteristics of designs changed in the 2000s. Large FPGAs admitted large designs that were complete subsystems. FPGA users were no longer working simply on implementing logic; they needed their FPGA design to adhere to systems standards. These standards were primarily communications standards for signaling and protocols, either to interface to external components or to communicate among internal blocks. Processing standards became applicable due to FPGAs growing role in computeintensive applications. As the FPGA grew as a fraction of the customer's overall system logic, its cost and power grew accordingly. These issues became much more important than they were in the Age of Expansion.
Pressure to adhere to standards, decrease cost and decrease power led to a shift in architecture strategy from simply adding programmable logic and riding Moore's Law, as was done in the Age of Expansion, to adding dedicated logic blocks [7] , [13] , [29] , [43] . These blocks included large memories, microprocessors, multipliers, flexible I/O and source-synchronous transceivers. Built of custom-designed transistors rather than ASIC gates, they were often even more efficient than ASIC implementations. For applications that used them, they reduced the overhead of programmability in area, performance, power and design effort [27] .
The result was the ''Platform FPGA,'' captured by the Xilinx Marketing slide from 2005 in Fig. 12 . Compare this with Fig. 10 . No longer was the message the millions of gates, but rather the pre-defined, high-performance dedicated blocks. Even the term ''gate'' had disappeared from the slide. This FPGA was not simply a collection of LUTs, flip-flops, I/O and programmable routing. It included multipliers, RAM blocks, multiple Power-PC microprocessors, clock management, gigahertz-rate source-synchronous transceivers and bitstream encryption to protect the IP of the design. FPGA tools grew to target this growing array of implementation targets.
To ease the burden of using the new functions and to meet system standards, FPGA vendors offered logic generators to build targeted functionality from a combination of their dedicated functions and soft logic [22] . Generators Trimberger: Three Ages of FPGAs and libraries of soft logic provided the interfaces to CoreConnect, AXI and other busses for peripherals on soft and hardened processors. They also built the bus protocol logic that wrapped around the fixed-function physical interfaces of serial transceivers. Xilinx System Generator and Altera's DSP Builder automated much of the assembly for DSP systems, constructed from a combination of fixed functions and LUTs. To simplify creation of microprocessor systems, Xilinx provided the Embedded Design Kit (EDK) while Altera released their Embedded System Design Kit (ESDK). Demonstrations of these capabilities included Linux running on the FPGA processor with video compression and decompression in the FPGA fabric.
But, what of those customers in the Age of Accumulation who do not need the fixed functions? To a customer who does not need a Power-PC processor, memory or multiplier, the area of that block is wasted, effectively degrading the cost and speed of the FPGA. At first, FPGA vendors tried to ensure those functions could be used for logic if they were not needed for their primary purpose. They provided ''large-LUT-mapping'' software to move logic into unused RAM blocks. Xilinx released the ''Ultracontroller'' to map state machines into microprocessor code for the hardened Power-PC in the Virtex-II Pro. But these measures were eventually perceived as unimportant. It is an indication of how far we had come from the Age of Invention that FPGA vendors and customers alike simply accepted the wasted area. A Xilinx Vice-President remarked that he would provide four Power-PC processors on an FPGA and did not care if customers did not use any of them. ''We give them the processors for free.''
XI. INTERLUDE: ALL AGES AT ALL TIMES
Dedicated blocks were not unique to the Age of Accumulation, just as increased device capacity was not unique to the Age of Expansion or architecture innovation unique to the Age of Invention. Gates, routing and three-state bussing were available in the Age of Invention, while arithmetic, memory and specialized I/O appeared in the Age of Expansion (Table 1) . Dedicated blocks have been added throughout the ages of FPGAs, and there is every indication that they will continue to evolve in variety and complexity. In general, though, successful dedicated functions have been generic in nature, using the flexibility of programmable LUTs and interconnect to customize the functionality. Attempts to produce niche-targeted or Application-Specific FPGAs have not proved successful, as they lose the advantage of volume manufacturing on which FPGA economics relies. This was, of course, until the Age of Accumulation gave rise to the ''communications FPGA.''
XII. AGE OF ACCUMULATION IN RETROSPECT

A. Applications
The biggest change in FPGAs in the Age of Accumulation was the change in the target application. The FPGA business grew not from general ASIC replacement, but from adoption by the communications infrastructure. Companies such as Cisco Systems used FPGAs to make custom data paths for steering huge volumes of internet and packetized voice traffic through their switches and routers [20] , [30] . Their performance requirements eliminated standard microprocessors and array processors, and unit volumes were within the FPGA crossover point. New network routing architectures and algorithms could be implemented in FPGAs quickly and updated in the field. In the Age of Accumulation, sales to the communications industry segment grew rapidly to well over half the total FPGA business. Of course, this success led major FPGA manufacturers to customize their FPGAs for the communications industry. Made-for-communications FPGAs incorporated high-speed I/O transceivers, thousands of dedicated highperformance multipliers, the ability to make wide data paths and deep pipelines for switching large amounts of data without sacrificing throughput. The dedicated blocks and routing that were added to better serve the communications application requirements reduced the available general logic area. By the end of the 2000s, FPGAs were not general-purpose ASIC replacements as much as they were data-routing engines. As multi-core processors and general-purpose graphics processor units (GPGPUs) appeared, FPGAs were still preferred for high-throughput, real-time computation. At the same time, FPGAs retained their generality. FPGA bitwise programmability assured their continued use in a wide range of applications, including control and automotive systems.
B. Moore's Law
Classical Dennard scaling, with simultaneous improvements in cost, capacity, power and performance, ended in the mid-2000s [5] , [18] . Subsequent technology generations still gave improvements in capacity and cost. Power continued to improve also, but with a clear tradeoff against performance. Performance gains from one technology node to the next were modest and were traded off against power savings. This effect is evident in the slowdown of performance growth in the 2000s in Fig. 1 . These tradeoffs also drove the accumulation of functions, because simple reliance on process technology scaling, as in the Age of Expansion, was not sufficient to improve power and performance. Hardening the logic provided the needed improvements.
We are now well into the next Age of FPGAs. What is this next age?
XIII. CURRENT AGE: NO LONGER PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC
By the end of the Age of Accumulation, FPGAs were not arrays of gates, but collections of accumulated blocks integrated with the programmable logic. They were still programmable but were not restricted to programmable logic. The additional dimensions of programmability acquired in the Age of Accumulation added design burden. Design effort, an advantage for FPGAs in their competition with ASIC, was a disadvantage in competition with newly arrived multi-core processors and GPUs.
Pressures continued to mount on FPGA developers. The economic slowdown beginning in 2008 continued to drive the desire for lower cost. This pressure is exhibited not only in the demand for lower price for functionality, but also in lower power consumption, which reflects the cost of using the devices [29] , [40] . Post-Dennard scaling processing technology failed to deliver the huge concurrent benefits in cost, capacity, performance, power and reliability that new process technology had delivered in preceding decades. Of particular concern was the demand for tradeoffs between power and performance. Now what?
A. Applications
During the Age of Accumulation, the ASIC companies that brought custom devices to market in the 1980s were quietly disappearing. Custom socket-specific ASIC devices still existed, of course, but only for designs with very large volume or extreme operating requirements. Did FPGAs defeat them? Well, partially. In the 2000s, ASIC NRE charges simply grew too large for most applications. This can be seen in Fig. 13 where development cost in millions of dollars is plotted against technology node. The development cost of a custom device reached tens, then hundreds of millions of dollars. A company that invests 20% of income on research and development requires half a billion dollars revenue from sales of a chip to justify one hundred million dollars development cost. The FPGA crossover point reached millions of units. There are very few chips that sell in that volume: notably microprocessors, memories and cell phone processors. Coupled with tight financial controls in the wake of another recession, the sales uncertainty and long lead time to revenue for new products, the result was inescapable: if the application requirements could be met by a programmable device, programmable logic was the preferred solution. The FPGA advantage from the very earliest days was still operating: lower overall cost by sharing development cost.
ASICs did not die. ASICs survived and expanded by adding programmability in the form of application specific standard product (ASSP) system-on-chip (SoC) devices. An SoC combines a collection of fixed function blocks along with a microprocessor subsystem. The function blocks are typically chosen for a specific application domain, such as image processing or networking. The microprocessor controls the flow of data and allows customization through programming as well as field updates. The SoC gave a structure to the hardware solution, and programming the microprocessors was easier than designing hardware. Leveraging the FPGA advantages, programmable ASSP devices served a broader market, amortizing their development costs more broadly. Companies building ASSP SoCs became fabless semiconductor vendors in their own right, able to meet sales targets required by high development costs.
Following the ASIC migration to SoC, programmable logic vendors developed programmable SoCs [12] . This is decidedly not the data-throughput engine so popular in the data communications domain and also not an array of gates. The Programmable System FPGA is a full programmable system-on-a-chip, containing memory, microprocessors, analog interfaces, an on-chip network and a programmable logic block. Examples of this new class of FPGA are the Xilinx All-Programmable Zynq, the Altera SoC FPGA, and the Actel/Microsemi M1.
B. Design Tools
These new FPGAs have new design requirements. Most importantly, they are software programmable as well as hardware programmable. The microprocessor is not the simple hardware block dropped into the FPGA as was done in the Age of Accumulation but includes a full environment with caches, busses, Network-on-Chip and peripherals. Bundled software includes operating systems, compilers and middleware: an entire ecosystem, rather than an integrated function block. Programming software and hardware together adds design complexity.
But this is still the tip of the iceberg. To achieve their goal of displacing ASICs or SoCs, FPGAs inherit the system requirements of those devices. Modern FPGAs have power controls, such as voltage scaling and the Stratix adaptive body bias [29] . State-of-the art security is required, including public-key cryptography in the Xilinx Zynq SoC and Microsemi SmartFusion. Complete systems require mixedsignal interfaces for real-world interfacing. These also monitor voltage and temperature. All these are required for the FPGA to be a complete system on a chip, a credible ASSP SoC device. As a result, FPGAs have grown to the point where the logic gate array is typically less than half the area. Along the way, FPGA design tools have grown to encompass the broad spectrum of design issues. The number of EDA engineers at FPGA companies grew to be comparable to the number of design engineers.
C. Process Technology
Although process scaling has continued steadily through the past three decades, the effects of Moore's Law on FPGA architecture were very different at different times. To be successful in the Age of Invention, FPGAs required aggressive architectural and process innovation.
In the Age of Expansion, riding Moore's Law was the most successful way to address an ever-growing fraction of the market. As FPGAs grew to become systems components, they were required to address those standards, and the dotcom bust required them to provide those interfaces at a much lower price. The FPGA industry has relied on process technology scaling to meet many of these requirements.
Since the end of Dennard scaling, process technology has limited performance gains to meet power goals. Each process node has delivered less density improvement as well. The growth in the number of transistors in each new node slowed as complex processes became more expensive. Some predictions claim the cost per transistor will rise. The FPGA industry, like the semiconductor industry as a whole, has relied on technology scaling to deliver improved products. If improvements no longer come from technology scaling, where do they come from?
Slowing process technology improvement enhances the viability of novel FPGA circuits and architecture: a return to the Age of Invention. But it is not as simple as returning to 1990. These changes must be incorporated without degrading the ease-of-use of the FPGA. This new age puts a much greater burden on FPGA circuit and applications engineers.
D. Design Effort
Notice how that last section focused on device attributes: cost, capacity, speed, and power. Cost, capacity and speed were precisely those attributes at which FPGAs were at a disadvantage to ASIC in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet they thrived. A narrow focus on those attributes would be misguided, just as the ASIC companies' narrow focus on them in the 1990s led them to underestimate FPGAs. Programmability gave FPGAs an advantage despite their drawbacks. That advantage translated into lower risk and easier design. Those attributes are still valuable, but other technologies offer programmability, too.
Design effort and risk are emerging as critical requirements in programmable logic. Very large systems are difficult to design correctly and require teams of designers. The problems of assembling complex compute or data processing systems drive customers to find easier solutions. As design cost and time grow, they become as much of a problem for FPGAs as ASIC NRE costs were for ASICs in the 1990s [16] . Essentially, large design costs undermine the value proposition of the FPGA.
Just as customers seeking custom integrated circuits 30 years ago were attracted to FPGAs over the complexity of ASICs, many are now attracted to multicore processors, graphic processing units (GPU) and software-programmable Application Specific Standard Products (ASSPs). These alternative solutions provide pre-engineered systems with software to simplify mapping problems onto them. They sacrifice some of the flexibility, the performance and the power efficiency of programmable logic for ease-of-use. It is clear that, while there are many FPGA users who need to exploit the limits of FPGA technology, there are many others for whom the technological capability is adequate, but who are daunted by the complexity of using that technology.
The complexity and capability of devices have driven an increase in capability of design tools. Modern FPGA toolsets include high-level synthesis compilation from C, Cuda and OpenCL to logic or to embedded microprocessors [10] , [11] , [35] . Vendor-provided libraries of logic and processing functions defray design costs. Working operating systems and hypervisors control FPGA SoC operation. Team design functions, including build control, are built into FPGA design systems. Some capabilities are built by the vendors themselves, others are part of the growing FPGA ecosystem.
Clearly, usability is critical to this next age of FPGAs. Will that usability be realized through better tools, novel architectures, exploitation of the process technology, or greater accumulation of fixed blocks? Most likely, just as every previous age was required to contribute to each successive age, all techniques will be needed to succeed. And more besides. As with the other Ages, the next Age of FPGAs will only be completely clear in retrospect. Throughout the age, expect to see time-honored good engineering: producing the best products possible from the available technology. This good engineering will be accomplished as the available technology and the definition of ''best'' continuously change.
XIV. FUTURE AGE OF FPGAS
What of the future? What is the age after this one? I refuse to speculate, but instead issue a challenge: remember the words of Alan Kay, ''The best way to predict the future is to invent it.'' h
